Paul Scully: Let me try to cover some of those questions. On microbusinesses and small business, this is effectively a standard definition that, yes, does exclude microbusinesses, because it replicates provisions in the Enterprise Act. The obvious question then is, “How do microbusinesses and small businesses get any redress in these examples?” but the business protection regulations would cover that, and they are not within the scope of this change. However, any of the changes that the hon. Lady requested would largely come under the affirmative procedure.
The hon. Lady also asked whether the Government had consulted widely on these enactments. Although we consulted widely on the Bill when I was a Minister in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, these provisions just restate existing law, so we just wrote that into the Bill, instead of spreading the provisions across statutory instruments. It would therefore not necessarily have been particularly informative to have consulted on them.
The hon. Lady asked about private designated enforcers and how an enforcer might be added to the list. The Secretary of State can by regulations add applicants as private designated enforcers that are able to use the court-based enforcement regime. Again, those regulations would be subject to the affirmative procedure, to ensure appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Any organisation applying for that status would need to provide evidence to the Secretary of State that it meets the designation criteria in clause 144(1), which would likely include evidence as to its legal status and constitution, a list of directors, examples of where it has protected the collective interests of consumers, and so on.
The Secretary of State will in due course set out more detailed guidance on the evidence and information that applicant organisations should provide when seeking designation. The Government clearly want to guarantee that those designated are able to protect the collective interests of consumers but are prevented from using that privileged position to seek any commercial gain or competitive advantage. They therefore intend that any private designated enforcer that fails to meet the criteria would have its designation altered or withdrawn by the Secretary of State.

Paul Scully: Let me try to cover as many of those questions as I can. The hon. Lady asked about the possibility of multiple enforcers in process at the same time. In effect, we are restating the existing arrangements, which have been working. They work with the CMA as the gatekeeper, so the CMA would have to be notified when action has been taken—it can filter anything going on in that regard—and it would have to co-ordinate the approach.
On clause 148, and court powers to make orders and penalties, the hon. Lady talked about subsection (9) on whether an undertaking may include a trader publishing it in a corrective statement and whether I, as a Minister, would always expect that to happen. It is discretionary. The enforcer may require that as appropriate.
On the penalties, the £300,000 basically sits in the middle of the pack internationally. If we look at the regimes around the world, where penalties are imposed  on individuals, New Zealand’s consumer protection system has £100,000 and Canada’s consumer regime has £450,000. We sit within that, looking at the international comparators.

Paul Scully: It was a fair balance after looking at international regimes—a fair comparison with similar regimes around the world. Similarly, the 10% penalty is reflected in penalties across other regimes.
The hon. Lady also asked about the CMA being able to enforce and why private enforcers did not have the same powers. Only the CMA may impose penalties. Private enforcers may seek a penalty in court, but the CMA is the only body able to issue penalties directly.
Finally—I have probably missed a couple of questions, but I will review them later just in case—on the interim notes, the hon. Lady made a fair point about stopping the immediate harm. I talked about domain names, as well as removing adverts and such things. It is about being able to act quickly. The whole point about the changes to the regime is to ensure that we make it not only as effective as possible in the modern world, but as fast as possible.

Paul Scully: I think the reason is the wide range of remediation events that may come before the enforcer to tackle, so they are being given that flexibility, but with an understanding that there is a general rule of expedition on the CMA. That is why we have approached this as we have.
The appeals regime is very different from the bits of the digital markets regime that we talked about earlier. In that case we were talking about a small number of firms with strategic market status, whereas any trader can be subject to this regime. The new monetary penalties that we are introducing are significant. A merits-based appeal is therefore important, because of the range of different-sized companies involved, to ensure fairness and to make sure that the issues involved relate to settled law rather than novel regulations covering digital conduct. Appeals are less likely to be disproportionately lengthy, because the digital market involves a more novel approach, which is why we were worried about extended appeal processes.
As for why thresholds are lower in this part of the Bill than for infringements, infringements, at £300,000, are clearly more serious. What we are talking about here—a breach of undertaking to a court—is still serious, but if someone is stepping down, we believe it is more proportionate to set the threshold at the slightly lower amount of £150,000.